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A Practical Password-Based Two-Server
Authentication and Key Exchange System
Yanjiang Yang, Robert H. Deng, Senior Member, IEEE, and Feng Bao
Abstract—Most password-based user authentication systems place total trust on the authentication server where cleartext passwords
or easily derived password verification data are stored in a central database. Such systems are, thus, by no means resilient against
offline dictionary attacks initiated at the server side. Compromise of the authentication server by either outsiders or insiders subjects all
user passwords to exposure and may have serious legal and financial repercussions to an organization. Recently, several multiserver
password systems were proposed to circumvent the single point of vulnerability inherent in the single-server architecture. However,
these multiserver systems are difficult to deploy and operate in practice since either a user has to communicate simultaneously with
multiple servers or the protocols are quite expensive. In this paper, we present a practical password-based user authentication and key
exchange system employing a novel two-server architecture. Our system has a number of appealing features. In our system, only a
front-end service server engages directly with users while a control server stays behind the scene; therefore, it can be directly applied
to strengthen existing single-server password systems. In addition, the system is secure against offline dictionary attacks mounted by
either of the two servers.
Index Terms—Password system, password verification data (PVD), user authentication, key exchange, offline dictionary attack.

1 INTRODUCTION
PASSWORD-BASED user authentication systems are low costand easy to use. A user only needs to memorize a short
password and can be authenticated anywhere, anytime,
regardless of the types of access devices he/she employs.
By and large, password has been the most pervasive user
authentication means since the advent of computers and is
still gaining popularity even in the presence of several
alternative strong authentication approaches, e.g., digital
signature and biometrics [15]. The reasons are straightfor-
ward: Password authentication requires no dedicated
device, which is of special importance as users are
becoming increasingly roaming nowadays. While smart-
cards or similar handheld devices offer good portability for
storing secret signing keys in digital signature generation,
they inevitably require supporting infrastructure (software,
hardware, and PKI) to work upon; moreover, safety of the
physical token itself is a concern: Theft or loss of the token
not only risks disclosing the secrets inside but also disables
the authentication functionality. As far as biometrics are
concerned, first, they also exclusively rely on costly under-
lying hardware and software infrastructure; second, bio-
metrics are typically created as an authentication means for
physical access control and have not yet matured enough to
support online services; third, there exist intense debates
and suspicion that biometrics may compromise individual
privacy if the biometrics data are leaked or abused [23].
However, the use of passwords has intrinsic weaknesses.
It is a well-known problem that human-user-chosen pass-
words are inherently weak since most users choose short
and easy to remember passwords. In particular, passwords
are normally drawn from a relatively small dictionary, so it
allows for brute-force dictionary attacks, where an attacker
enumerates every possible password in the dictionary to
determine the actual password. Dictionary attacks can be
mounted online or offline. In an online dictionary attack,
attackers attempt to log in to a server by trying all possible
passwords from the dictionary until they find a correct one.
In an offline dictionary attack, attackers record a past
successful login session between a user and a server and
then check all the passwords in the dictionary against the
login transcript. Online dictionary attacks can be easily
thwarted at the system level by limiting the number of
unsuccessful login attempts made by a user. In contrast,
offline dictionary attacks are notoriously harder to deal
with. As a result, tremendous effort has been dedicated to
countering offline dictionary attacks in password systems.
1.1 Related Work
It is a proven fact that public key techniques (e.g., exponentia-
tions in a multiplicative group) are absolutely necessary to
make password systems secure against offline dictionary
attacks, whereas the involvement of public key cryptosystems
under a PKI (e.g., public key encryption and digital
signature schemes) is not essential [13]. This observation
differentiates two separate approaches to the development
of secure password systems: combined use of a password
and public key cryptosystem under a PKI, and a password-
only approach. The former takes into account the asym-
metry of capabilities between users and servers, so a user
only uses a password while the server has a public/private
key pair at its disposal. Examples of such public key-
assisted password systems include [11], [13], [6]. In these
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systems, the use of public keys entails the deployment and
maintenance of a PKI for public key certification and adds
to users the burden of checking key validity. To eliminate
this drawback, password-only protocols (password authen-
ticated key exchange or PAKE) have been extensively
studied, e.g., [1], [4], [5], [19], [20], [7]. The PAKE protocols
do not involve any public key cryptosystem under a PKI
and, therefore, are much more attractive for real-world
applications. We believe that any use of public key
cryptosystem under a PKI in a password authentication
system should be avoided since, otherwise, the benefits
brought by the use of password would be counteracted to a
great extent.
Most of the existing password systems were designed
over a single server, where each user shares a password or
some password verification data (PVD) with a single
authentication server (e.g., [1], [4], [5], [6], [7], [16], [11],
[13], [19], [20]). These systems are essentially intended to
defeat offline dictionary attacks by outside attackers and
assume that the sever is completely trusted in protecting the
user password database. Unfortunately, attackers in prac-
tice take on a variety of forms, such as hackers, viruses,
worms, accidents, misconfigurations, and disgruntled sys-
tem administrators. As a result, no security measures and
precautions can guarantee that a system will never be
penetrated. Once an authentication server is compromised,
all the user passwords or PVD fall in the hands of the
attackers, who are definitely effective in offline dictionary
attacks against the user passwords. To eliminate this single
point of vulnerability inherent in the single-server systems,
password systems based on multiple servers were pro-
posed. The principle is distributing the password database
as well as the authentication function to multiple servers so
that an attacker is forced to compromise several servers to
be successful in offline dictionary attacks.
The system in [10], believed to be the first multiserver
password system, splits a password among multiple
servers. However, the servers in [10] need to use public
keys. An improved version of [10] was proposed in [14],
which eliminates the use of public keys by the servers.
Further and more rigorous extensions were due to [21] and
[22], where the former built a t-out-of-n threshold
PAKE protocol and provided a formal security proof under
the random oracle model [8] and the latter presented two
provably secure threshold PAKE protocols under the
standard model. While the protocols in [21] and [22] are
theoretically significant, they have low efficiency and high
operational overhead. In these multiserver password
systems, either the servers are equally exposed to the users
and a user has to communicate in parallel with several or all
servers for authentication, or a gateway is introduced
between the users and the servers. We shall further discuss
the disadvantages of the multiserver models in Section 2.
Recently, Brainard et al. [3] proposed a two-server
password system in which one server exposes itself to
users and the other is hidden from the public. While this
two-server setting is interesting, it is not a password-only
system: Both servers need to have public keys to protect the
communication channels from users to servers. As we have
stressed earlier, this makes it difficult to fully enjoy the
benefits of a password system. In addition, the system in [3]
only performs unilateral authentication and relies on the
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) to establish a session key between
a user and the front-end server. Subsequently, Yang et al.
[24] extended and tailored this two-server system to the
context of federated enterprises, where the back-end server
is managed by an enterprise headquarter and each
affiliating organization operates a front-end server. An
improvement made in [24] is that only the back-end server
holds a public key. Nevertheless, the system in [24] is still
not a password-only system. We notice that the two-server
system presented in [17] does not follow the two-server
paradigm in [3], [24], but is a special case of the earlier
multiserver systems (see Section 2 for details).
1.2 Our Contribution
We continue the line of research on the two-server
paradigm in [3], [24], whereas we extend the model by
imposing different levels of trust upon the two servers, and
adopt a very different method at the technical level in the
protocol design. As a result, we propose a practical two-
server password authentication and key exchange system
that is secure against offline dictionary attacks by servers
when they are controlled by adversaries. Our system is a
password-only system in the sense that it requires no public
key cryptosystem and, thus, no PKI. This makes our system
very attractive considering PKIs are proven notoriously
expensive to deploy in real world. Moreover, our proposed
system is particularly suitable for resource-constrained
users due to its efficiency in terms of both computation
and communication. We generalize the basic two-server
model to an architecture of a single back-end server
supporting multiple front-end servers and envision inter-
esting applications in federated enterprises.
1.3 Organization
In Section 2, we discuss different server models for
password systems and specify the two-server architecture
upon which ours is built. We then present our two-server
password authentication and key exchange protocols in
Section 3. In Section 4, we describe applications and
extension of the proposed system, followed by some
discussions in Section 5. Finally, we draw concluding
remarks and give future work in Section 6.
2 THE TWO-SERVER ARCHITECTURE
Password systems are normally built over the following
four types of architectures shown in Fig. 1.
The first type is the single-server model given in Fig. 1a,
where a single server is involved and it keeps a database of
user passwords. As mentioned earlier, most of the existing
password systems follow this single-server model, but the
single server results in a single point of vulnerability in
terms of offline dictionary attacks against the user password
database.
The second type is the plain multiserver model depicted in
Fig. 1b, in which the server side comprises multiple servers
for the purpose of removing the single point of vulner-
ability; the servers are equally exposed to users and a user
has to communicate in parallel with several or all servers
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for authentication. Clearly, the main problem with the plain
multiserver model is the demand on communication
bandwidth and the need for synchronization at the user
side since a user has to engage in simultaneous commu-
nications with multiple servers. This may cause problems to
resource-constrained mobile devices such as hand phones
and PDAs. The systems in [10], [14], [21] and one of the two
protocols in [22] assume this model.
The third type is the gateway augmented multiserver model
shown in Fig. 1c, where a gateway is positioned as a
relaying point between users and servers and a user only
needs to contact the gateway. Apparently, the introduction
of the gateway removes the demand of simultaneous
communications by a user with multiple servers as in the
plain multiserver model. However, the gateway introduces
an additional layer in the architecture, which appears
“redundant” since the purpose of the gateway is simply to
relay messages between users and servers, and it does not
in any way involve in service provision, authentication, and
other security enforcements. From security perspective,
more components generally imply more points of vulner-
abilities. Protocols based on the gateway augmented multi-
server model include [17] and [22].
The fourth type is the two-server model (outlined in
Fig. 1d), that comprises two servers at the server side, one of
which is a public server exposing itself to users and the other
of which is a back-end server staying behind the scene; users
contact only the public server, but the two servers work
together to authenticate users. It is important to note the
essential differences between the two-server model and the
earlier multiserver models: 1) In the two-server model, a
user ends up establishing a session key only with the public
server, and the role of the back-end server is merely to assist
the public server in user authentication, while in the
multiserver models, a user establishes a session key (either
different or the same) with each of the servers. For exactly
this reason, we view the two-server system in [17] as a
special case of the gateway augmented multiserver model
of two servers. 2) From a security point of view, servers in
the multiserver models are equally exposed to outside
attackers (recall that the gateway in the gateway augmented
multiserver model does not enforce security), while in the
two-server model, only the public server faces such a
problem. This clearly improves the server side security and
in turn the overall system security in the two-server model.
Another observation on the two-server model is that we
can assume different levels of trust upon the two servers
with respect to outside attackers. Specifically, the back-end
server is more trustworthy than the public server. This is
logical since the back-end server is located in the back-end
and is hidden from the public, and it is thus less likely to be
attacked. Further justifications with respect to inside
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Fig. 1. Models of password systems. (a) Single-server model. (b) Plain multiserver model. (c) Gateway augmented multiserver model.
(d) Two-server model.
attackers come from the application and extension of our
proposed two-server system in Section 4. As we will see
shortly, this assumption is well exploited in our design of
the password authentication and key exchange protocols.
It is clear that the two-server model has successfully
eliminated drawbacks in the plain multiserver model (i.e.,
simultaneous communications between a user and multiple
servers) and the gateway augmented multiserver model
(i.e., redundancy) while allowing us to distribute user
passwords and the authentication functionality to two
servers in order to eliminate a single point of vulnerability
in the single-server model. As a result, the two-server
model appears to be a sound model for practical applica-
tions. However, as we pointed out earlier, the existing
systems upon the two-server model such as [3], [24] do not
suffice; we are thus motivated to present a password-only
system over the two-server model. In particular, in our
system, the public server acts as a service server that provides
application services, while the back-end server is a control
server whose sole purpose is to assist the service server in
user authentication (the service server, of course, also
participates in user authentication). This enforces clear
separation of duty in our system. We highlight that in the
plain multiserver model and the gateway augmented multi-
server model, several or all servers equally participate in
service provision as well as user authentication, which is
implied by the fact that a user negotiates a session key with
each server. We also generalize the two-server model to an
architecture that a control server supports multiple service
servers (see Section 4).
3 TWO-SERVER PASSWORD AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOLS
In this section, we elaborate on our proposed password
authentication and key exchange protocols upon the two-
server model. In particular, we first present a basic protocol,
and examine its security; we then show how to circumvent
the weaknesses contained in the basic protocol by present-
ing an improved protocol. Compared to the systems in [3],
[24], we completely avoid the use of a public key
cryptosystem at the server side. Our protocols are quite
efficient in terms of both communication and computation.
For ease of reference, notations that are used below are
listed in Table 1.
3.1 System Model
Three types of entities are involved in our system, i.e., users,
a service server (SS) that is the public server in the two-
server model, and a control server (CS) that is the back-end
server. In this setting, users only communicate with SS and
do not necessarily know CS. For the purpose of user
authentication, a user U has a password which is trans-
formed into two long secrets, which are held by SS and CS,
respectively. Based on their respective shares, SS and CS
together validate users during user login.
We assume the following security model: CS is con-
trolled by a passive adversary and SS is controlled by an
active adversary in terms of offline dictionary attacks to user
passwords, but they do not collude (otherwise, it equates
the single-server model). By definition (e.g., [12]), a passive
adversary follows honest-but-curious behavior, that is, it
honestly executes the protocol according to the protocol
specification and does not modify data, but it eavesdrops on
communication channels, collects protocol transcripts and
tries to derive user passwords from the transcripts; more-
over, when an passive adversary controls a server, it knows
all internal states of knowledge known to the server,
including its private key (if any) and the shares of user
passwords. In contrast, an active adversary can act
arbitrarily in order to uncover user passwords. Besides,
we assume a secret communication channel between SS
and CS for this basic protocol. We shall discuss how to
remove this assumption in the improved protocol.
We stress that this security model exploits the different
levels of trust upon the two servers. As discussed earlier, this
clearly holds with respect to outside attackers. As far as
inside attackers are concerned, justifications come from our
application and generalization of the system to the archi-
tecture of a single control server supporting multiple service
servers, where the control server affords and deserves
enforcing more stringent security measurements against
inside attackers (please refer to Section 4 for details). Notice
that the assumption we make here is already weaker than
that in [24], where the back-end server is strictly passive and
is not allowed to eavesdrop on communication channels,
while CS in our setting is allowed for eavesdropping. We
believe this weakening is important and more realistic since
eavesdropping is practically easy and insidious.
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TABLE 1
Notations
3.2 High-Level Description
Central to our protocol design is the defense against offline
dictionary attacks by the servers when they are controlled
by adversaries. The intuition is to “harden” a user’s short
password  into two long shares 1 and 2 in such a way
that they are no longer subject to offline dictionary attacks,
and then distribute them to the two servers. As a result, an
attacker cannot succeed in offline dictionary attacks without
grabbing both shares by compromising both servers.
During user login, the control server CS using its share 2
assists the service server SS using 1 in user authentication.
More specifically, in an out-of-band user registration phase,
user U splits his password  into two long random secrets
1 and 2 and registers them to SS and CS, respectively,
where 1 þ 2 ¼ . During authentication, U using  and SS
using 1 authenticate each other and negotiate a secret
session key, with the help of CS using 2.
3.3 User Registration
In any password system, to enroll as a legitimate user in a
service, a user must beforehand register with the service
provider by establishing a shared password with the
provider. In our system, U needs to register not only to the
service provider SS but also to the control server CS. Let us
suppose U has already successfully identified himself to SS,
e.g., by showing his identification card, U splits his
password  into two long random numbers 1 2R Zq and
2 2R Zq such that 1 þ 2 ¼  ðmod qÞ, where q is defined in
Table 1. U then registers in a secure manner 1 and 2 to SS
and CS, respectively. SS stores the account information (U,
1) to its secret database, and CS stores (U, 2) to its secret
database. In case CS supports multiple servers, it stores (U,
2, SS) to distinguish users associated with different
servers. This completes the user registration phase. One
may wonder how U registers 2 to CS as CS is supposed
hidden from U . This actually is not a problem in practice: U
can reach CS through out-of-band channels, such as postal
mail. Indeed, imagine that a user enrolls in a bank; it is not
strange at all that the user still needs to submit a secret to a
higher authority of the bank so as to activate his account.
3.4 A Basic Password Authentication Protocol
Let p, q, g1, g2, and hð:Þ be defined in Table 1. We outline the
basic password authentication protocol in Fig. 2, which
enables mutual authentication and key exchange between U
and SS. In the figure, we have omitted the modulo p
notation for arithmetic operations, as this should be clear
from the context.
To initiate a request for service, U sends his identity
together with a service request Req to SS in M1. SS first
relays the request to CS by sending the user ID in M2, and
then selects a random number b1 2R Zq and computes B1 ¼
gb11 g
1
2 ðmod pÞ using his password share 1. Upon receiving
M2, CS chooses a random number b2 2R Zq and computes
B2 ¼ gb21 g22 ðmod pÞ using his password share 2. CS then
sends B2 in M3 to SS. Upon reception of B2, SS computes
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Fig. 2. A basic password authentication and key exchange protocol.
and sends B ¼ B1B2ðmod pÞ to U in M4. After receiving
M4, U selects a 2R Zq, and computes A ¼ ga1ðmod pÞ, S0u ¼
ðB=g2Þa ¼ gaðb1þb2Þ1 ðmod pÞ and Su ¼ hðS0uÞ, respectively. U
then sends A and Su to SS in M5. Getting the message, SS
computes S1 ¼ Ab1ðmod pÞ and sends S1, A and Su to CS in
M6. Upon receipt ofM6, CS computes S2 ¼ Ab2ðmod pÞ and
checks whether Su ¼? hðS1S2Þ ¼ hðgaðb1þb2Þ1 Þ: If it holds, CS is
assured of the authenticity of U , and continues the protocol
by sending S2 to SS in M7; otherwise, CS aborts the
protocol.
Assuming SS receives S2 in M7, it checks whether
Su ¼? hðS1S2Þ. If it holds, SS is convinced of the authenticity
of U. At this stage, both servers have authenticated U. SS
then computes and sends Ss ¼ hð0; S1S2Þ to U in M8 and
afterward computes a session key K ¼ hðU;SS; S1S2Þ;
otherwise, SS aborts the protocol. Upon receiving M8, U
checks if hð0; S0uÞ ¼? Ss. If it holds, U has validated the
servers and then computes a session key K ¼ hðU;SS; S0uÞ;
otherwise, U aborts the protocol.
3.5 Security Analysis
In what follows, we analyze the security of the basic
protocol. Our analysis is based on the following Decisional
Deffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [2]:
DDHAssumption. Let p, q be defined as in Table 1, and g; h 2R
Zp of order q, for every probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm A, the following condition is satisfied:
AdvDDHG ðAÞ ¼ jPr½Aðg; h; gr; hrÞ  Pr½Aðg; h; gr; zÞj < ;
ð1Þ
where r 2R Zq , z 2R QRp, and  is a negligible function.
Informally speaking, it is computationally intractable for A to
distinguish between ðg; h; gr; hrÞ and ðg; h; gr; zÞ.
Recall that the primary goal of our protocol is to resist
offline dictionary attacks by the two servers, where CS is
controlled by a passive adversary and SS is controlled by
an active adversary. Accordingly, we examine the protocol
against CS, SS, and an active outside adversary that does
not control any server, respectively.
Claim 1. The protocol is robust against offline dictionary attacks
by CS as a passive adversary.
Proof. Intuitively, when CS is controlled by a passive
adversary, it may eavesdrop on the communication
channels to collect protocol transcript and try to launch
offline dictionary attacks against the password of U.
Clearly, CS can obtain B1 ¼ B=B2 ¼ gb11 g12 ðmod pÞ from
M4. However, from B1 alone, CS cannot learn any-
thing of 1 in an information theoretic sense. What
remains relevant to CS for offline dictionary attacks are
[A ¼ ga1, Su ¼ hððB=g2ÞaÞ], and [S1 ¼ Ab1 , B1 ¼ gb11 g12 ].
The first pair is clearly no easier than [A ¼ ga1,
S0u ¼ ðB=g2Þa] for CS to deal with in terms of offline
dictionary attacks; we thus suppose CS knows S0u for
ease of analysis. Note that A ¼ ga1 ) g1 ¼ Aa
1ðmod pÞ
and S0u ¼ ðB=g2Þa ) B=g2 ¼ S0a
1
u ðmod p). Under the
DDH assumption, CS cannot distinguish between
[A, g1 ¼ Aa1 , S0u, B=g2 ¼ S0a
1
u ] and [A, A
a1 , S0u, z],
where z 2R QRp. This suggests that CS cannot get
anything on  from the first pair. For the second
pair, B1 ¼ gb11 g12 ) B=g12 ¼ gb11 ðmod pÞ, and again under
the DDH assumption, CS cannot distinguish between [A,
S ¼ Ab1 , g1, B=g12 ¼ gb11 ] and [A, Ab1 , g1, z]. This shows
that CS cannot learn anything on 1 from the second pair.
Consequently, CS, controlled by a passive adversary,
cannot be effective in offline dictionary attacks. This
completes the proof. tu
It is important to note that in the above analysis, we
have implicitly assumed that CS does not know a, the
discrete logarithm of A to the base g1. However, were CS
controlled by an active adversary, such an assumption
would no longer hold since CS could simply impersonate
U, choose a, and compute A ¼ ga1ðmod pÞ. CS could also
break the system if it were able to replace the original A
from U with another one based on an a of its choice. In
both cases, CS could find the password  by offline
dictionary attacks. To see this, consider the second pair
where CS knows a ¼ log gA1 ðmod qÞ and the Diffie-Hellman
quadruple [A, S1 ¼ Ab1 , g1, B2=g12 ¼ gb11 ]. It follows that
ðB2=g12 Þa ¼ ðB2=g22 Þa ¼ Ab1 ¼ S1, so CS could try every
possible password to determine the actual  with the
knowledge of 2. This explains at the technical level why CS
is assumed to act as a passive adversary.
Observe that CS relies on direct computation of
g
aðb1þb2Þ
1 ðmod pÞ to validate the authenticity of U, and the
same data is also exploited by SS and U to authenticate each
other and negotiate a secret session key. This suggests that
if CS were an active attacker, it could establish a session key
in the name of SS. This is another reason for CS being
passive.
Claim 2. The protocol is robust against offline dictionary attacks
by SS as an active adversary.
Proof. First, if controlled by a passive adversary, help for SS
in terms of offline dictionary attacks is [A ¼ ga1,
Su ¼ hððB=g2ÞaÞ] and [S2 ¼ Ab2 , B2 ¼ gb21 g22 ]. Following
a similar analysis as for CS, we can show that SS is unable
to learn anything on either  or 2 from the two pairs.
What remains to consider is when SS launches active
attacks, in which case SS may behave arbitrarily such as
impersonating U and modifying and replacing messages.
From the security analysis for CS, we know that if SS
replacesA coming from U with ga1 based on his choice of a
and, if this is not detected by CS, SS can obtain  by
offline dictionary attacks. Fortunately, different from the
case of CS, this attack cannot succeed for the following
reasons: S2 is sent to SS in M7 only after CS has already
decided on the validity of Su¼? hðS1Ab2Þ; it is not possible
for SS to change A and also make Su ¼? hðS1Ab2Þ pass the
test of CS. As a result, as an active attacker, SS is still not
effective in offline dictionary attacks. tu
Claim 3. The protocol is secure against an active outside
adversary controlling no server.
Proof. Attacks by an active adversary who does not control
any server include offline dictionary attacks against user
passwords and attempt to acquire the session key K
established between U and SS. For the former, intuitively,
such an adversary clearly is no more effective than SS.
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For the latter, the adversary could do as follows:
1) Impersonate any of U, SS, and CS. Clearly, this requires
the adversary to derive any of , 1, and 2 by offline
dictionary attacks in order for an impersonation to
succeed. 2) Compute the value of g
aðb1þb2Þ
1 ðmod pÞ from
the protocol transcript. Of help to this end are Su, Ss, S1,
and S2. Obviously, inverting Su and Ss is impossible if the
underlying hash function is secure. On the other hand,
since the communication channel between SS and CS is
secret, the attacker cannot observe S1 and S2. tu
It is interesting to notice that having only one of S1 and
S2 does not help an outside attacker in computing
g
aðb1þb2Þ
1 ðmod pÞ. Therefore, one-way secrecy of the channel
between SS and CS suffices to guarantee the secrecy of the
session key.
3.6 An Improved Protocol
There are two weaknesses in the above basic protocol. The
first one is made obvious by recalling that we assumed a
secret channel between SS and CS in the system model. The
second one is that CS can compute the session key
established between U and SS, so CS gets to know the data
exchanged between them. While CS is passive, this clearly
affects the principles of “need to know” and “separation of
duty.” To address these weaknesses, recall an earlier
observation in Section 3.5 that one-way secrecy of the
channel between U and SS actually suffices in the above
basic protocol. Our solution, indeed, takes advantage of this
observation by having SS concealing Ab1ðmod pÞ while still
enabling CS for user authentication.
The system setting and the security model are the
same as in the basic protocol, except that no secret
communication channel between SS and CS is assumed.
Supposing U has already registered 1 to SS and 2 to CS
as in the basic protocol, we present an improved
password authentication protocol in Fig. 3, where the
system parameters are defined in Table 1, arithmetic
operations associating with g1 and g2 are modulo p, and
operations associating with g3 are modulo Q.
This improved protocol is very similar to the basic
protocol in Fig. 2, with the only exception that we introduce
the arithmetic operations associating with g3, which are
represented by Su, S1 and the checks performed by SS and
CS. By checking it against the basic protocol, we believe it is
not hard to understand this improved protocol. So, we do
not repeat the process of the protocol execution here. Next,
we first check correctness of the protocol.
3.6.1 Correctness
For the purpose of verifying U, CS needs to check Su ¼?
hðSAb21 ðmod QÞ, and SS needs to check Su ¼? hðSS21 ðmod QÞ.
To make the checks work, it must hold that
g
ðgaðb1þb2Þ
1
mod pÞ
3 ðmod QÞ ¼ g
ðgab1
1
mod pÞðgab2
1
mod pÞ
3 ðmod QÞ:
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Fig. 3. An improved password authentication and key exchange protocol.
Notice that if the order of g3 is p 6¼ p, then the exponentia-
tion parts of g3 at both sides of the equation are not
necessarily equal, that is, g
aðb1þb2Þ
1 ðmod pÞðmod pÞ is of high
possibility to not equal ðgab11 mod pÞðgab21 mod pÞðmod pÞ,
which, in turn, suggests the equation does not hold.
Conversely, if the order of g3 is p as in the protocol, the
equation is bound to hold as
g
aðb1þb2Þ
1 ðmod pÞðmod pÞ ¼ ðgab11 mod pÞðgab21 mod pÞðmod pÞ:
3.6.2 Security
We next examine security of this improved protocol. As we
stated, this protocol is quite similar to the basic protocol,
except for the introduction of computations associating with
g3. It should be clear that this change makes it no easier to CS
and SS for the purpose of offline dictionary attacks, as direct
computation or guessing of x from g
gx1
3 ðmod QÞ is clearly no
easier than from gx1ðmod pÞ. As a matter of fact, nor does this
change make it harder for CS and SS with respect to offline
dictionary attacks, since it is of equal possibility to guess x
from g
gx1
3 ðmod QÞ and from gx1ðmod pÞ. We thus focus on the
effect of removal of the secret channel between SS and CS,
and whether CS can compute the session key between U and
SS. Clearly, the removal of the secret channel would, in
principle, facilitate outside adversaries who do not control
any server to derive the session key between U and SS.
Compared to the basic protocol, an outside adversary
additionally gleans S1 ¼ gðA
b1 Þ
3 ðmod QÞ and S2 ¼ Ab2ðmod pÞ.
The adversary needs to know Ab1ðmod pÞ in order to derive
the session key. However, the additional S1 ¼ gðA
b1 Þ
3 ðmod QÞ
does not help the adversary in computingAb1ðmod pÞ, which
is equivalent to computing the discrete log of S1. This
suggests the removal of the secret channel between SS and
CS does not, in fact, facilitate the outside adversary. For
exactly the same reason, CS cannot compute the session key
either with the knowledge of S1.
As a result, we have managed to remove the weaknesses
contained in the basic protocol.
3.7 Performance of the Protocols
In this section, we examine performance of our proposed
two protocols. Let jpj and jhj denote the bit length of p and
the hash function hð:Þ, respectively. We outline the
performance results in Fig. 4. We have three aspects to
evaluate:
1. Computation performance. Since exponentiations
dominate each party’s computation overhead, we
only count the number of exponentiations as the
computation performance. The digits before “/”
denote the total number of exponentiations
performed by each party, and the digits following
“/” denote the number of exponentiations that
can be computed offline. Note that by leveraging
on the techniques in [9], each of gb11 g
1
2 ðmod pÞ and
gb21 g
2
2 ðmod pÞ can be computed by a single
exponentiation.
2. Communication performance in terms of bits. As jQj is
only 1 bit longer than jpj, we do not distinguish
between jpj and jQj for ease of comparison. In
addition, we have neglected including the band-
width of M1 and M2 in this aspect of calculation.
3. Communication performance in terms of rounds. One
round is a one-way transmission of messages.
Fig. 4 shows that the proposed two protocols demon-
strate similar performance and are, in general, quite
efficient in terms of both computation and communication
to all parties. Take U , for example; it needs to calculate 3 and
4 exponentiations in the two protocols, respectively, and 2 of
them can be performed offline. This means U only computes
1 and 2 exponentiations in real time in the respective
protocols; the communication overhead for U is particularly
low in terms of both bits and rounds. As a result, our
protocols can readily support wireless applications.
4 APPLICATIONS
Clearly, our system can be straightforwardly adapted to
strengthen existing single-server password systems such as
FTP and e-mail systems by adding an additional control
server. In such applications, the control server and the
service server are most probably managed in the same
administrative domain. The system architecture is the same
as in Fig. 1d.
We next generalize the basic two-server model to an
architecture where a single control server supporting multi-
ple service servers depicted in Fig. 5. In such an architecture,
the control server and the service servers are managed in
different administrative domains, and the domain where the
control server resides enforces more stringent security
measurements. More interesting applications can be envi-
sioned for this generalized architecture. A good example of
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Fig. 4. Performance of the proposed protocols.
such applications is in a federated enterprise, where many
divisions, branches, and affiliations unite under a single
enterprise authority. Each of the affiliating organizations that
serves different aspect of a business continuum and service
coveragehas its ownbusiness interest andprovides service to
a distinct group of users. Our proposed system can be
implemented in such a federated enterprise as follows: The
single control server is managed by the enterprise head-
quarter that has more funds and better security expertise,
while each affiliating organization operates a service server
that provides a certain service to its own users.
The generalized two-server architecture and the applica-
tions appear to further justify the security model we have
assumed upon the earlier two protocols, that is, the control
server is controlled by a passive adversary while the service
server is controlled by an active adversary. In an enterprise
environment, compared to the affiliating organizations, the
enterprise headquarter clearly presumably has more budget
and better security expertise and, thereby, is in a better
position to manage a more trustworthy control server. The
competence of the enterprise headquarter should provide a
better safeguard not only against outside adversaries but also
against inside attackers such as the system administrator. For
example, the enterprise headquarter deploys a dedicated
control server to restrict insider access, so that only the
system administrator has access to the control server.
It is also interesting to note that our proposed protocols
technically support the generalized architecture since, from
the performance results in Fig. 4, the workload in both
computation and communication upon the control server is
quite low. Of course, with adequate funds, the headquarter
can always deploy a more powerful hardware for the
control server or even deploy multiple control servers.
5 DISCUSSIONS
Our proposed two-server password system together with
its practical applications offers many appealing features:
1. A single point of vulnerability, as in the existing
password systems, is totally eliminated. Without
compromising both servers, no attacker can find
user passwords through offline dictionary attacks.
The control server being isolated from the public,
the chance for it being attacked is substantially
minimized, thereby increasing the security of the
overall system. As we have shown in the security
analysis, the system is also resilient to offline
dictionary attacks by outside attackers. This feature
allows users to use easy to remember passwords
and still have strong authentication and key
exchange.
2. The system has no compatibility problem with the
single-server model. This is of importance, as most
of the existing password systems use a single server.
3. In the system, a password is split into two random
numbers. Therefore, a user can use the same pass-
word to register to different service servers; they
connect either to distinct control servers or to the
same control server. This is a highly desirable
feature since it makes the system user friendly. A
big inconvenience in the traditional password
systems is that a user has to memorize different
passwords for different applications.
4. The generalization as well as the applications of the
two-server password system well support the
underlying security model, in the sense that the
enterprise headquarter naturally assumes adequate
funds and strong security expertise and, therefore,
affords and is capable of maintaining a highly
trustworthy control server against both inside
attackers and outside attackers. Without the concern
of a single point of vulnerability, affiliating organi-
zations that operate service servers are offloaded to
some extent from strict security management, so
they can dedicate their limited expertise and
resources to their core competencies and to enhan-
cing service provision to the users.
5. From the perspective of users, they are able to
assume the higher creditability of the enterprise
while engaging in business with individual affiliat-
ing organizations.
It is clear that we have involved the headquarters of a
federated enterprise in the partial trust management of its
affiliating organizations. One may ask why we do not
simply rely on the control server for full trust management
in federated enterprise applications, a paradigm similar to
Kerberos [18]. First, in practice, each affiliating organization
has its own business interest; hence, it has a stake in being
involve in the trust management of its own; second and
more important, one of the main objectives of our system is
to eliminate a single point of vulnerability. In practice,
adversaries take on a variety of forms and no security
measures and precautions can guarantee that a system will
never be penetrated. By avoiding a single point of
vulnerability, it gives a system more time to react to attacks.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a password-based authentica-
tion and key exchange system that is built upon a novel
two-server model, where only one server communicates to
users while the other server stays transparent to the public.
Compared with previous solutions, our system possesses
many advantages, such as the elimination of a single point
of vulnerability, avoidance of PKI, and high efficiency.
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Fig. 5. A generalized two-server architecture of a single control server
supporting multiple service servers.
In contrast to existing multiserver password systems, our
system has great potential for practical applications. It can
be directly applied to fortify existing standard single-server
password applications, e.g., FTP and Web applications. It
can also be applied in the federated enterprise setting, where
a single control server supports multiple service servers.
The security model underlying our proposed protocols
assumes that the control server can only be controlled by a
passive adversary. As we have claimed, this assumption,
while strong, is quite logical considering the positioning of
the two servers in the two-server model and the applica-
tions of the model to federated enterprises. It is, however,
clear that weakening of this assumption should be of both
practical and theoretical significance, which we shall take as
our future work. Our future direction also includes a formal
treatment of our proposed system.
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